Death Watch: Why America Was Not Allowed to Watch Timothy McVeigh Die by Barnidge, Robert Perry, Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 3
Issue 1 Fall 2001 Article 11
10-1-2001
Death Watch: Why America Was Not Allowed to
Watch Timothy McVeigh Die
Robert Perry Barnidge Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Barnidge Jr., Death Watch: Why America Was Not Allowed to Watch Timothy McVeigh Die, 3 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 193 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol3/iss1/11
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 3, IssuE 1: FALL 2001
Comment: Death Watch: Why America Was Not Allowed To
Watch Timothy McVeigh Die
Robert Perry Barnidge, Jr.1
I. Introduction
Timothy J. McVeigh was sentenced to death on August 14,
1997, for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, which left 168 people dead.2 Although
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft explained that "all
the citizens of the United States were victims of the crimes
perpetrated by Mr. McVeigh,",3 all such victims were not allowed
to watch McVeigh's execution by lethal injection at the United
States Penitentiary at Terre Haute (USPTH) on June 11, 2001 .
Partly because of the logistical difficulties in
accommodating the wishes of the survivors and the victims'
families in personally viewing McVeigh's execution, Ashcroft
approved of a setup whereby a closed circuit transmission of
McVeigh's execution would be available exclusively to
"authorized survivors and family members of victims, and
designated counselors and government representatives." 5 Among
the stipulations were that the broadcast would be
1 J.D. Candidate 2003, University of North Carolina School of Law; B.A.,
Government and International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1999.
2 See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176-1179 (10th Cir. 1998).
3 Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
4 CNN, The Execution of Timothy MeVeigh, at
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/okc/ (last visited November 14, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).51d.
contemporaneous, instantaneous, and without recording of any
kind and that it would utilize encryption technology with state-of-
the-art videoconferencing over high-speed digital telephone lines.
6
In Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin,7 Internet content
provider Entertainment Network, Inc. (ENI) requested permission
to record and simultaneously broadcast McVeigh's execution via
the Internet or, alternatively, to gain access to the live audiovisual
transmission of the execution for the purpose of broadcasting that
material.8 The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) declined ENI's request on
the grounds that 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f)9 prohibited such recording.' 0
Section 26.4(f) states that, except as otherwise ordered by a court,
"[n]o photographic or other visual or audio recording of... [an]
execution shall be permitted."" ENI's challenge was "to its face,"
meaning that, if successful, the section 26.4(f) ban could no longer
be enforced against any member of the press.
1 2
In upholding the constitutionality of the regulation, the
court found that it was content neutral and gave the media
sufficient alternative means of informing the public about
executions. Even were this not the case, overriding penological
concerns and a general deference to the prison system still required
that the ban be enforced. 13
6 id.
71d. at 1002.8Id. at 1007-1008.
9 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) (2001).
'oSee Entr 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-1008.
"28 C.F.R. § 26.4(1).
2 Ent 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 483 (1989); Women's Med. Prof I Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d
187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998)).
"3 See id. at 1018-19.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
This note examines the reasons why the ENI court upheld
the ban on the press's ability to record executions. After
explaining the court's reasoning, it will discuss how, although the
ruling was not surprising, the court erred in finding section 26.4(f)
to be content neutral and gave unwarranted, uncritical weight to
the government interest in upholding the ban. Given the terrorist
events in New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11,
2001, this note also examines the press's rights of access in the
event that suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden should be somehow
captured, tried in an American court, and executed. It will finally
present a number of compromises that would have been more
appropriate on the facts of EN
II. Press Not Guaranteed First Amendment Rights of Access
Greater than Public
The ENI court stated that the First Amendment rights of the
press to information must be analyzed in relation to information
available to the general public.14 The court relied on Garrett v.
Estelle15 in this part of its analysis. 16 In Garrett, a news reporter,
Garrett, sought permission from the Texas Department of
Corrections to film interviews with inmates on death row and to
film a prisoner's execution, the first execution under Texas' new
capital punishment statute. 17 Garrett sought an injunction to
compel Texas not to curtail his interviewing of inmates on death
14 See Entre 't Network, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (referencing Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965)).
15 Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
16 See Entm 't Network, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-13.
17 Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276.
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row or his filming of executions. 18 The district court, in a
preliminary injunction, held that article 43.17 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure 19 violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, that the press should be allowed to visit death row,
that the provisions allowing for a press pool at executions should
be reinstated, and that Garrett, as a member of the press, should be
allowed to film executions.
20
Texas appealed the district court's order that required it to
allow Garrett to film executions. 21 It relied on recent Supreme
Court decisions which held that the press's right of access to
prisons or prisoners does not exceed the general public's right and
contended that "since the public has no right under the first [sic]
amendment [sic] to film executions, a member of the press has no
such right. '
22
In particular, the Garrett court relied on Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.23 and Pell v. Procunier24 for the general
principle that the press's right of access to information is not
18 1d. at 1276-77.
19 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.17 (2001) (stating that "Upon receipt of
such condemned person by the Director of the Department of Corrections, the
condemned person shall be confined therein until the time for his or her
execution arrives, and while so confined, all persons outside of said prison shall
be denied access to him or her, except his or her physician, lawyer, and
clergyperson, who shall be admitted to see him or her when necessary for his or
her health or for the transaction of business, and the relatives and friends of the
condemned person, who shall be admitted to see and converse with him or her at
all proper times, under such reasonable rules and regulations as may be made by
the Board of Directors of the Department of Corrections").
20 Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1277.21 ird.
22 id.
23 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
24 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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greater than the general public's right and that the government is
not obligated to give the press access to information not available
to the general public.25 Put differently, the First Amendment rights
of the press do not "accompany the press where the public may not
go."
2 6
Pell also supports the proposition that a state is not required
to give the press rights of access to information greater than those
given to members of the public.27 In Pell, members of the press
argued that section 415.071 of the California Department of
Corrections Manual2 8 was unconstitutional because it prevented
them from conducting in-person interviews with specific prison
inmates and amounted to state interference with the press.
29
However, the Court reasoned that because section 415.071
prohibited both the press and the public from conducting such
interviews, it was consistent in its prohibition, did not discriminate
against the press, and did not violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
30
United States v. McDougal31 also supports the proposition
that the First Amendment does not grant the press rights of access
25 See Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1277 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S.
843, 850).26 d. at 1279.
27 Pell, 417 U.S. at 833-34.
28 See id. at 819 (quoting section 415.071 of the California Department of
Corrections Manual as stating that "[p]ress and other media interviews with
specific individuals will not be permitted").29 See id. at 833.
30 See id. at 835 (stating "since § 415.071 does not deny the press access to
sources of information available to members of the general public, we hold that
it does not abridge the protections that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee").
31 United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1996).
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greater than those of the general public.32 In McDougal, press
organizations and a non-profit citizens' group sought physical
access to the videotaped recording of President Bill Clinton's
deposition in an underlying criminal case.33 The district court
denied the plaintiffs' request for the videotapes,34 and its ruling to
withhold rights of access to the videotapes for the press was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.35 The McDougal court, like the
ENI court, stated that the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press greater rights than those afforded the general public.
36
According to the McDougal court, "members of the public,
including the press, were given access to the information contained
in the videotape. Therefore, appellants received all the information
to which they were entitled under the First Amendment."
37
In summary, the ENI court cited two cases involving press
rights of access to prisons, Garrett and Pell, and one case dealing
with press rights to material not available to the general public in a
non-prison context, McDougal, for the proposition that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press rights of access that
exceed the rights of access afforded the general public.38 Since
members of the general public were prohibited from recording
McVeigh's execution, the court reasoned that the state was not
required to give a member of the press, ENI, this right of access.
The First Amendment did not require it; ENI was not guaranteed it.
32 Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1013 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
33 McDougal, 103 F.3d at 652.34 1d. at 654.
35 1d. at 659.
36 See id.
37 id.
38 See Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1010-13 (S.D. Ind.
2001).
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HI. Government Regulation Must Be Content Neutral
ENI also argued that by preventing the press from making
photographic, audio, and visual recordings of executions, section
26.4(f) was not content neutral and, thus, was subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis.39 Essentially, ENI stated that the regulation was
an attempt by the government to censor content in violation of the
First Amendment. ENI argued that the content of written and
verbal accounts of an execution differs in a substantive way from
the photographic, audio, and visual recordings prohibited by
section 26.4(f), 40 in that "human accounts are subject to 'spin' and
perspective, whereas the broadcast is not. ENI argues, therefore,
that the BOP is denying the public information based on its
content. ' 41 However, the court disagreed with ENI's
understanding of the word "content" and found no First
Amendment violation on such grounds.4
2
The ENI court adopted the test set forth in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism43 to determine whether a government regulation is
content neutral.44 According to the test, the "principal inquiry...
is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys .... [t]he
government's purpose is the controlling consideration." 45
I91d. at 1014.
40rd4o Id.411rd.
42 See id.
43 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
44 See Entm 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
45 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
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Essentially, to qualify as content neutral, a government regulation
must be "justified without reference to the content of the speech
[and must serve] ... purposes unrelated to the content, ... even if
it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others."46
According to the court, section 26.4(f) did not discriminate
based on content in its ban on photographic, audio, and visual
recordings of executions because, in this case, "the medium is not
the message. 47 The court held that, despite the ban, "the public
can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas and information need
not be inhibited.
4 8
JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense,49 cited by the
ENI court,5° explores the content neutrality principle. JB Pictures,
Inc. centered around a military policy that, in the context of
Operation Desert Storm, prevented press access to the arrival of
the remains of fallen soldiers at interim stops or ports of entry.
51
The plaintiffs argued that this ban amounted to "impermissible
'viewpoint discrimination.', 52 The prohibition on their presence at
the unloading of the caskets, the plaintiffs asserted, was
unconstitutional content-based discrimination. 53 They argued that
such coverage conveys a certain content, apparently a content,,54
"necessarily laden with anti-war implications, and because of
46EnIM 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (referencing Ward, 491 U.S. at
791; Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
4 7 
id.
48 Id. at 1015 (citing Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977)).
49 J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. Dep't of Defense, 86 F.3d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
50Entr 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
51 See JB Pictures, Inc., 86 F.3d at 238.
12 id. at 238.5 1 Id. at 239.
54 rd.
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this, prohibiting such press coverage was the equivalent of
shielding anti-war content from the public.
The JB Pictures, Inc. court doubted that images of caskets
being unloaded would necessarily have anti-war implications.
55
According to the court, "[o]ne has only to think of Pericles's
famous speech honoring the first Athenians killed in the
Peloponnesian War, or the Gettysburg Address, to recognize that
one cannot easily pigeonhole the meaning of a return of soldiers
killed in battle. 56 Because the JB Pictures, Inc. court did not
believe that images of the unloading of caskets conveyed a content,
i.e., an anti-war content, not otherwise accessible by the public, it
held that a government policy prohibiting such press coverage
could not, and did not, amount to content discrimination. 7
According to the ENI court, filming an execution, like
filming the unloading of caskets, conveys nothing of substance that
cannot be otherwise conveyed through written and verbal accounts
to the public 58 Section 26.4(f), therefore, was content neutral in
its scope, reach, and application.
59
55 Id.56 Id. Apparently, the court suggested that public perceptions of war and
attitudes toward American casualties have not changed since the Peloponnesian
War or the Gettysburg Address. The court perhaps overlooked the impact of
public support for the war effort during the Vietnam War when images of
American body bags were broadcast into American homes. Such images
conveyed an unmistakable, tangible, anti-war content to viewers that traditional
newspaper accounts simply could not.
57 See JB Pictures, Inc., 86 F.3d 236.
58 See Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014-1015 (S.D.
Ind. 2001).
59 See id.
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IV. "Time, Place, and Manner" Restrictions Must Allow for
Other Means of Communication and Involve a Substantial
Government Interest
Having detennined that the regulation was content neutral
in its application, the court considered that it might be a "time,
place, and manner" restriction.6" Referencing United States v.
Kerley,61 the court stated that section 26.4(f) was a manner
restriction on news coverage. 62 A content neutral regulation of
time, place, and manner, such as section 26.4(f), is permissible
"only if it is supported by a substantial government interest and
does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.,
63
In considering the possibility of a substantial government
interest, the court stated that questions of press rights of access
must never be "unmoored from the particular settings in which the
claims have been considered. 64 The particular setting in ENI
required a consideration of the legitimate goals and policies of the
prison system.65 Put simply, the main concerns of the court were
prison safety and stability,66 and prison policies were to be
afforded "wide-ranging deference." 67
60 Id. at 1015 (citing United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 747 F.2d
111, 114 (2d Cir. 1984)).
61 United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985).
62 Entm 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d at 1015 (referencing Kerley, 753 F.2d
617).63 Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)).
64 Id. at 1016.
65 Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
66 See id. at 1017-18.
67 Id. at 1017 (quoting Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1991)).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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The court applied the reasonableness standard of Turner v.
Safley68 in assessing whether a substantial government interest
existed.69 The Turner considerations are:
1) Whether there is a valid, rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate,
neutral governmental interest; 2) If alternative
means of exercising the constitutional right remain
open to prison inmates; 3) The impact an
accommodation of the asserted right would have on
the guards and other inmates, and on the allocation
of prison resources; and 4) The absence of ready
alternatives.70
The BOP gave four justifications for the regulation. 71
Warden Harley Lappin of the USPTH gave more specific reasons
for the regulation.72 According to Lappin, there were five concrete
reasons for the ban on the press's recording of executions:
[F]irst, that to maintain security and good order in a
prison setting, it is important that inmates
understand and believe that they will be treated like
68 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
69 See Ent 't Network, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18.
70 Id. at 1017 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
71 Id. (quoting the purposes given by the Bureau of Prisons for the regulation as:
"(i) the prevention of the sensationalizing of executions, (ii) the preservation of
the solemnity of executions, (iii) the maintenance of security and good order in
the Federal Prison System, and (iv) protection of the privacy rights of a
condemned individual, the victims, their families and those who participate in
carrying out the execution").
72Id. at 1017-18.
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human beings and not dehumanized; second, that
the government's interests in not sensationalizing
and preserving the solemnity of executions is [sic]
based upon the danger that if prison inmates were to
see the execution on television or receive word of
the televised event through other means, the inmates
may well see the execution as 'sport' which
dehumanizes them; third, that when inmates feel
that they are dehumanized or devalued as persons,
agitation amongst the inmates is frequently
fomented, which in turn can lead to prison
disturbances;fourth, that a broadcast would violate
the privacy of condemned persons, and would also
'strip[] away' the privacy and dignity of victims and
their families; andfifth, that 'a public broadcast of
the execution would violate the privacy and
seriously put at risk the safety of those charged with
implementing the sentence of death.'
73
Lappin described a volatile prison atmosphere in which section
26.4(f) acted as a linchpin, perhaps among many regulations, that
prevented the prison from becoming a place of anarchy and high
disorder in which the safety of both prison officials and inmates
would be jeopardized. The court stated that the government
interest in maintaining this particular regulation was substantial
and that the prison system should be given deference. According
to the court, execution procedures are within the particular
expertise of prison officials and, absent a showing of an
73 1d. at 1018.
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exaggerated response to such considerations, courts ordinarily
should defer to their judgment.74
The second requirement when a regulation is content
neutral but constitutes a time, place, and manner restriction is, as
stated above, that it "not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. ' 75 The court referenced Kerley.76 In Kerley, the
defendant unsuccessfully requested permission to videotape and77
broadcast his court proceedings. The court considered whether
"it is reasonable to conclude that the marginal gains from
videotaping and broadcasting an already public trial, which
members of the public and media will be free to attend and to
report on, are outweighed by the risks and uncertainties the
procedure, in the minds of some, entails." 78 The Kerley court held
that there were significant government interests in and
justifications for the ban,79 and indeed, the availability of other
means of communication meant that the ban did not unreasonably
abridge opportunities for thought communication. 80 Put
differently, when both an alternative means of communication is
available and a substantial government interest is present, the court
may uphold a restriction on press rights of access to information.
On the facts of ENI, the court was able to show that section
26.4(f) was permissible despite being a time, place, and manner
74 Id. (citing Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 982-83
(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974))).
75 Id. at 1015 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986)).76 United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985).
77 id.
71Id. at 621.
79 id.
8 0 Id. at 620 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581-
82 n. 18 (1980) (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941))).
FALL20011
restriction. It found a strong government interest in promoting a
safe prison environment, as well as acceptable alternative reporting
methods. The court concluded that the press could still effectively
cover McVeigh's execution.
V. What If Timothy McVeigh Were Osama Bin Laden?
Given the terrorist events in New York City and
Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, it is interesting to
speculate how the press's rights of access might unfold in the event
that bin Laden should be somehow captured, tried in an American
court, and executed.81
The actions of McVeigh and bin Laden were similar in a
number of respects. Each masterminded acts of terrorism on
American soil. A large loss of life resulted from each terrorist act:
168 deaths from McVeigh's act and at least 4,537 deaths from bin
Laden's act.82
Attorney General Ashcroft asserted that "all the citizens of
the United States were victims of the crimes perpetrated by Mr.
McVeigh. ' '83 It is difficult to imagine that Ashcroft would not be
able to make the same statement about the tragedy on September
11, 2001. Indeed, while not in the least seeking to belittle the
horrors of Oklahoma City, an even stronger case can be made that
all Americans were victims of the attacks on September 11, 2001:
the bin Laden-executed terrorism caused a much greater loss of
American life, has caused a fundamental rethinking of both
81 See supra note 13.
82 David Bamber, Bin Laden: Yes, IDid It, TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 11,
2001, at 1.83 Entm'tNetwork, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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American domestic and foreign policy, and has resulted in a
significant economic downturn.
In the case of McVeigh's execution, Ashcroft made
provisions for a closed circuit transmission to a select group of
survivors and victims' families, among others. It seems that the
victims' families of the September 11, 2001, attacks would have a
consistent argument that they should be similarly entitled to view
bin Laden's execution. Based on sheer numbers and space
considerations, however, this could require the equivalent of filling
New York City's Madison Square Garden for a closed circuit
transmission of bin Laden's execution.
In an effort to record the execution, members of the press
would probably make the same arguments to record the execution
that were made by ENI. Similarly, the government would
probably make the same arguments for the ban on the press's
recording of executions as it did in ENI. The government would
likely succeed in arguing that the ban was content neutral and that
viable and sufficient alternative means of informing the public
were otherwise available to the press. It would also likely argue
for an overriding government interest in preventing a closed circuit
transmission of bin Laden's execution to a select group of
survivors, victims' families, and others. First, it could be argued
that the sheer number of survivors, victims' families, and others
who would, theoretically, be eligible to view bin Laden's
execution would make such a live broadcast the equivalent of a
public execution. On the international front, the idea of a large
audience viewing bin Laden's execution would likely enrage many
American allies, who might see it as a barbaric throwback to the
days of the Roman gladiator. There would also be national
security concerns.
FALL 2001]
It is unlikely that Ashcroft would make the exception for a
closed circuit transmission to a select group of survivors, victims'
families, and others in the case of bin Laden's execution, and it is
almost certain that the press would not be allowed to record the
execution.
VI. ENI's Better Wisdom: Analysis and Possible Compromise
While the decision in ENI was not surprising, the court
improperly glossed over ENI's assertion that section 26.4(f)
discriminated on the basis of content and gave unwarranted,
uncritical acceptance to Lappin's justifications for the ban. Given
the facts and case law surrounding the case, it seems that ENI had
a stronger case than the court credited it with and that a
compromise might have been more appropriate.
The court failed to fully appreciate ENI's argument that
section 26.4(f) was not content neutral. A strong argument can be
made that broadcasting McVeigh's execution would have
conveyed a more tangible understanding of it to the public than
newspaper accounts and after-the-fact verbal commentaries by
witnesses and, thus, may have risen to the "conveyance of new
information" standard. Furthermore, Ashcroft's bending of the
traditional rules governing executions to allow a closed circuit
transmission of McVeigh's execution to survivors and victims'
families in Oklahoma City suggests that there was something
significant that the chosen in Oklahoma City were able to receive
in viewing the execution that they would not have been able to
receive if their experience was limited to traditional written and
verbal accounts. In a way, then, by allowing the exception,
Ashcroft acknowledged that the closed circuit transmission
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
conveyed some important content that the survivors and the
victims' families would otherwise have missed.
The court's deference to the prison system on the grounds
of an overriding substantial government interest in affirming
section 26.4(f) was misplaced.84 The court assigned great
importance to Lappin's affidavit and found it to be highly
influential, though it is interesting that the court did not give
further weight to the contrary opinion of another veteran of the
corrections system, Raymond K. Procunier" While it
acknowledged the existence of Procunier's contrary opinion, the
court single-handedly dismissed it by stating that his views did not
"render Warden Lappin's explanation inadequate." 86 It is curious
that Procunier's points are never mentioned while Lappin's are
articulated point for point.
Lappin, for instance, emphasized the policy prerogative of
not dehumanizing inmates. While no one responds well to
dehumanizing treatment, it remains highly questionable how
capital punishment does not dehumanize inmates, notwithstanding
efforts to sanitize it.
He also expressed his concern about inmates seeing a
televised execution or otherwise learning of a televised
execution. 87 Inmates, particularly in a maximum-security prison,
are well aware that capital punishment is carried out by the state;
further, they usually also know when executions are in fact carried
out. Since inmates would, in any event, hear about the execution
84 The policy of a substantial government interest being able to override the
press's First Amendment rights could close the door on information that the
government does not want the press and, thereby, the public to know.
8S See Entm 'tNetwork, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
86 id.
87 id.
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through other means, such as the print media or television news, an
argument can be made that televised executions would not
represent a "huge leap" from current media coverage, to which
inmates are already exposed. Even if the press were allowed to
broadcast executions, prisons could enforce a ban on television
viewing by inmates during a televised execution. Finally, it could
be argued that the broadcasting of executions might actually have a
desirable deterrent effect, especially among inmates.
Lappin also expressed his concern that lifting the ban
would undermine the safety and anonymity of those who
administer or otherwise play key roles in executions.88 Clearly, it
would be wrong to endanger the lives of prison workers. While
Lappin's concern is valid and understandable, it is not totally
convincing as a reason to ban televised executions. Some
compromise agreement could have been reached with the media
whereby prison workers' anonymity would be maintained via
blurred facial images that cloud executioners' identities on camera.
This is already a common and effective practice used in the
television industry for interviews with people who wish to remain
anonymous on camera.
In addition to blurred facial images to obscure
executioners' identities on camera, there are a number of other
compromises that the court could have considered in sanitizing the
process of recording executions. For instance, members of the
press could record executions but would be required to submit
recorded film to a censoring board, consisting of government
officials or government officials and appropriate members of the
press or public. The censoring board would then have some
discretion to edit the material but would have to allow publication
88id.
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of the recording within a particular timeframe after the execution.
Given the sensitive nature of the subject, there could be further
restrictions as to the number of times that the execution could be
aired or limitations on the hours of broadcast. The restrictions
should not be so great, however, as to render useless and
impractical the press's First Amendment right to inform the public
without unreasonable government interference.
VII. Conclusion
The broadcast of executions would play an interesting role
in the ongoing national debate on capital punishment. In recent
years, the issue of DNA testing and fears that innocent people have
been or are currently on death row throughout the country have
made national headlines, as did Illinois Governor George Ryan's
decision in 2000 to impose an indefinite moratorium on capital
punishment in Illinois.89 Indeed, McVeigh's execution came at a
time of "deep and growing ambivalence about the death penalty, to
the point that bare majorities of Americans favor[ed] a moratorium
on executions - or even a law replacing them with mandatory life
in prison."90 Why, in this atmosphere, is the government unwilling
to let the general public see what happens in the execution
chamber? After all, it is the public, as taxpayers, who fund capital
punishment.
89 See CNN, DNA Testing Frees Virginia Death Row Inmate (Feb. 11, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/200 I/LAW/02/11/virginia.death.penalty/index.html (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
90 ABC News, Death Penalty Ambivalence: Poll Points To Support For
Execution Moratorium In U.S. (May 2, 2001), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/polI010504_deathpenalty.htnl
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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Given that the current ban discriminates based on content
and that the government interest in maintaining it is exaggerated,
one must wonder why the press is not allowed to record executions
as a way of informing the public. Is the government afraid that if
Americans saw a recorded execution, support for capital
punishment would decrease? If a public outcry were to occur,
would it undermine the stability of the criminal justice system?
By permitting the press to record executions, the
government, with the prison establishment as its surrogate, might
undermine its position and the current legitimacy of capital
punishment as a tool of deterrence, a way to eliminate society's
most-hated individuals. Certainly, the government does not want
to lose its grip on executions as an option.91 In this context, the
broadcasting of executions could not only be an effective way for
the press to hold the government accountable, but it could also
shift the burden to the government to justify its use of capital
punishment.
91 Practically speaking, courts may also fear that allowing filming of executions
will open up a Pandora's box on similar issues where media recording rights are
circumscribed or non-existent, such as at court proceedings.
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